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1 |  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of Vietnam's economy. They account for 
45% of gross domestic product, 97.6% of enterprises and 51% of total employment in 2014 (Malesky, 
2016). Globally, SMEs contribute 50% of output and comprise 60–70% of employment and have been the 
main contributors to the industrialisation and growth of some countries such as Germany (International 
Trade Centre, 2015). Because of their relative contributions to output and employment, SMEs have the 
potential to be growth engines if the multitude of internal and external operational challenges they face 
are resolved through policies that allow SMEs to "connect, compete and change" (International Trade 
Centre, 2015). Recognising this potential, on 12 June, 2017, Vietnam's National Assembly passed the 
Law on Support for Small‐ and Medium‐sized Enterprises (KPMG, 2017).1 The new law builds on two 
previous plans to develop and increase the competitiveness of the country's SMEs.2 The new law pro-
vides a wide range of general support, from credit access (Article 8) to human resource development 
1 English version of the law (National Assembly Law No. 04/2017/QH14) is available at http://vbpl.vn/tw/Pages/ vb-
pqen-toanv an.aspx?ItemI D=11095 . Throughout the paper, SMEs' broad definition which includes microenterprises is used.
2 Decree No. 56/2009/NĐ‐CP dated 30 June, 2009 approved the first comprehensive approach to aid the development of 
SMEs in Vietnam while Decision No. 1231/QĐ‐TTg dated 7 September, 2012 approved Vietnam's 2011–15 Small and 
Medium Enterprises Development Plan.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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(Article 15). The new law also provides specific support for household enterprises and innovative SME 
start‐ups (Articles 16–20). Most important for our purposes are support for SME market expansion 
through product distribution chains (Article 13) and SME participation in value chains (Article 19). For 
example, the law provides exemptions or reductions in enterprise income tax for organisations investing 
in or operating product distribution chains involving at least 80% SMEs supplying made‐in‐Vietnam 
products (Article 13). The law also provides in‐depth training in production technology or help with 
product development to qualified SMEs (Article 19). Enhancing SME competitiveness sets the stage for 
them to be a major contributor to Vietnam's growth in the coming decades.
Opportunities for foreign and domestic market expansion are options available to Vietnam's SMEs. 
Available data show that the country's SMEs are not only domestic‐market oriented, and their activ-
ities are highly localised. As described in detail below, among enterprises in the survey data we use, 
27–29% of the sales of their most important product are to entities in their home communes, and 
81–84% of sales are to entities in their home provinces. Understanding why SME sales are highly 
localised is important as over reliance on a single market exposes SMEs to idiosyncratic risks asso-
ciated with this one locale. Market diversification not only minimises market demand risks but also 
makes possible the sourcing of lower cost inputs. However, market diversification is not costless as 
it entails additional resource commitments from SMEs. For SMEs to take advantage of opportunities 
in foreign markets, there is a need to understand why they have much difficulty in selling beyond 
their home markets in the first place. Is this due to size and other enterprise characteristics? Or is the 
home (market) bias due to the quality of governance prevailing not only in SMEs' home market (i.e., 
home province), but also in other potential markets (i.e., other provinces) in Vietnam? This last point 
is crucial as the new law on supporting SMEs gives provincial administrators responsibilities to carry 
out certain provisions of the law (Articles 11, 18 and 25). For example, subject to local government 
finance conditions, provincial officials are tasked to develop industrial clusters or processing zones for 
SMEs in their jurisdictions, or to provide rental support for SMEs in industrial parks through subsidies 
to industrial park investors (Article 11). Complementary policies across Vietnam's provinces are crit-
ical if product distribution chains and value chains are to span the whole country.
If SME sales are highly localised, does this mean that Vietnam's domestic market is highly frag-
mented?3 If so, this by itself has implications on the conduct of macroeconomic policy and develop-
ment of policies to minimise the observed income disparity across regions. Latest data (2016) show 
wide variation in monthly current per capita income ranging from a little over VND5.1 million (about 
US$230 at the mean rate of VND22,380/US$ in 2016) in Ho Chi Minh City to VND1.2 million (about 
US$54) in Dien Bien province (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018). Poverty rates are highest 
in the northern midlands and mountain areas with the provinces of Dien Bien and Lai Chau having the 
highest poverty rates at 26.1 and 27.9%, respectively. Provinces in the southeast have the lowest pov-
erty rates with Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong province achieving zero poverty rate since 2013 
and 2014, respectively (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018).
This paper contributes to the home bias (trade) literature where administrative or political borders 
limit trade across borders. First documented by McCallum (1995) wherein 44% of Canada's exports 
are within province shipments, 23% are shipments to other Canadian provinces, and the balance are 
shipments to the United States (24%) and the rest of the world in 1988. Conditional on trade partners' 
distance to each other and economic size, McCallum finds that trade among Canadian provinces is 
3 Available data show variation in the cost of living across the country's regions. For example, for tradeable items such as 
food, prices in the Central Highlands (Mekong River Delta) are 5.41 (5.17) % higher (lower) than food prices in the Red 
River Delta in 2015. Garments and footwear prices are 8.73% higher in the Midlands and Northern Mountain areas than in the 
Red River Delta (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018).
   | 3321CO et al.
17–29 times the trade between Canadian provinces and US states. That is, there is home bias or na-
tional borders matter (border effect). A widely accepted explanation is that national political borders 
proxy for tariffs and non‐tariff barriers, as well as other trading costs such as customs clearance and 
exchange rate conversions. Home bias is also observed using subnational (province or state) data. For 
example, Wolf (2000) documents that intrastate exports range from 20% (Delaware) to more than 60% 
for California, Florida, Texas and Washington. Various specifications of the trade gravity equation 
show that intrastate (within state) shipments in the United States are three to four times the size of 
interstate (between states) shipments, and adjacent US states trade 2.6 times more with each other.
Since McCallum's (1995) and Wolf's (2000) pioneering work, factors such as hub‐and‐spoke arrange-
ment between manufacturers and wholesalers, networks, agglomeration economies, policy or governance 
variation across regions, and differences in the characteristics of goods being traded are found to explain 
the size of the home bias or border effect. We provide a detailed review of the literature in the next section, 
but a recent contribution by Coughlin and Novy (2018) is worth highlighting in this introductory section 
as we build on their research. Interestingly, Coughlin and Novy (2018) find heterogeneity in the size of 
the border effects for US states: border effects are stronger (weaker) for smaller (larger) states. The authors 
refer to this as spatial attenuation effect. One observes spatial attenuation effect because spatial aggrega-
tion leads to changes in the relative size of trade costs associated with internal (within border) trade and 
trade across borders. As spatial units become large, internal trade costs increase relative to trade costs 
associated with crossing the border, this results in larger cross‐border trade. This implies that the estimated 
home bias or border effect reflects a combination of two spatial frictions: first, frictions of a general form 
due to spatial aggregation (a statistical artefact), and second, frictions specifically due to state borders 
(fundamentals). Moreover, Coughlin and Novy (2018) conclude that the border effect heterogeneity they 
observe at the state level might also be due to frictions at the micro level of firms and households, and a 
way to advance our understanding of border effects is to study the phenomena at this level of detail.
We take Coughlin and Novy's (2018) challenge to use firm‐level data to understand the nature of sub-
national home bias. The availability of shipment data across various markets at the enterprise level in the 
‘Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam’ makes this possible. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to use enterprise‐level data to investigate home bias. One advan-
tage of using enterprise level over aggregate (e.g., state or province level) data is that we can test the notion 
if home bias is due to SME market entry strategies shaped by SME attributes and/or governance quality 
prevailing in various potential markets. We consider the governance quality of SMEs' home province, 
neighbouring provinces and non‐neighbouring provinces. This is motivated by a recent contribution from 
Miranda and Wagner (2018) who find that having neighbours with weak institutions reduces a country's 
exports. It is important to shed light on the possible reasons for home bias because if this is principally due 
to variations in local area governance quality (rather than enterprise attributes), then there is strong incen-
tive for policymakers to provide conducive environments for access into their markets. If subnational pol-
icies have spatial spillover effects, then policy coordination among subnational policymakers is necessary.
In the next section, an overview of relevant literature is provided. Section 3 describes the data and 
empirical methodology in detail. We analyse the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 contains a 
discussion of the implications of our findings and concluding remarks.
2 |  RELATED LITERATURE
Building on Wolf's (2000) research, Hillberry and Hummels (2003) provide one possible explanation 
for the observed subnational home bias. They suggest that US manufacturers use a network of whole-
salers to distribute their output over long distances (across state lines), and wholesalers distribute 
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these to retailers over short distances (within each state). Accounting for this hub‐and‐spoke distribu-
tion arrangement among producers, wholesalers and retailers lowers estimated subnational home bias 
by a third.4 In a subsequent study, Hillberry and Hummels (2008) decompose bilateral commodity 
trade flows within and between US zip codes into their various components. For the most part, they 
find that the effects of spatial frictions are largest over very short distances, and they reduce trade 
flows principally through a reduction in the number of unique shipments and not through a reduction 
in the average value of shipments. They observe that "most (US) establishments ship only to geo-
graphically proximate customers, rather than shipping to many customers in quantities that decrease 
in distance" (Hillberry & Hummels, 2008, p. 548). Due to unavailability of data, the authors did not 
explore the characteristics of establishments impacted most by geographic trade frictions. Because 
making goods available in several markets entails (additional) set‐up costs, what establishment type 
only ships to customers very close to it, or will not ship to markets that are not nearby? We can provide 
answers to questions like these using enterprise‐level data.
Augmenting state‐to‐state trade data with state‐foreign country trade data, Coughlin and Novy 
(2013) estimate a larger state border effect than the international border effect. The authors attribute 
this finding to the local concentration of economic activities (agglomeration economies) rather than 
barriers to crossing state lines.
Using commodity flow data between and within French départements, Combes, Lafourcade, and 
Mayer (2005) find that the home bias effect is overestimated by 50–60% when network effects are 
omitted. The study highlights the role of social networks (i.e., migrant networks) and business net-
works (i.e., business group membership) in reducing information costs, thereby increasing trade flows. 
The authors find that intraregional trade is 5.7–8 times more than interregional trade when network 
effects are considered, and networks increase trade by three to four times.5 The importance of net-
works is also evident in research using Japanese data.
Administratively, Japan has 47 prefectures. Wrona (2018) divides Japan into two equal‐sized east 
and west prefecture blocks and finds a "border" effect in the absence of a border using commodity 
flow data within and between Japan's 47 prefectures. Assignment into these prefectural blocks is not 
due to past historical borders or past civil wars (which might affect current trade flows), yet prefec-
tures belonging to the same prefectural block (east or west) trade more with each other. Specifically, 
trade between east and west Japan is 23.1–51.3% lower than within prefectural‐block trade. Wrona 
attributes the "‘border" effect to Japan's current dual (east and west) business and social networks 
traceable to how economic activities agglomerated into an east (Tokyo) and west (Osaka) pattern after 
the Second World War, and to prefectures' cultural proximity based on "historical dialect data … an 
outcome of an evolutionary process shaped by past interactions" (Wrona, 2018, p. 1235). The number 
of headquarter‐plant links and migration flows proxy for business and social networks, respectively. 
Cultural proximity and thus networks not only contribute to larger prefectural‐block trade, Wrona 
(2018) also finds that their effects are stronger within each prefectural block.
4 Excluding shipments from wholesalers shows a much lower magnitude of subnational home bias. Hillberry and Hummels's 
(2003) estimates imply a 1.55 ratio between predicted and actual within‐state trade compared with a 4.39 ratio using Wolf's 
(2000) estimates. In other words, there is subnational home bias, but not as large as originally thought.
5 A branch of the literature suggests that home bias is a mere statistical artefact (omitted variable bias). Using trade flow data 
among Spanish provinces, Garmendia et al. (2012) find that once networks are included in trade gravity equations, the home 
bias effect is present only when data are measured in quantity rather than values. Their results are consistent with Millimet 
and Osang's (2007, p. 95) findings using US commodity flow data that "subnational border effect disappears in the majority 
of specifications that include lagged shipments and internal migration…".
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Through their long‐lasting effects on institutions and preferences, historical events (such as civil 
wars) can affect current economic outcomes such as trade flows. Although the north–south "border" 
is long gone, states on opposing sides during the US Civil War trade less with each other even after 
150 years (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014). Although the authors are unable to determine whether the 
observed north–south "border" effect is due to trade costs (e.g., networks formed differently in the 
north and south after the Civil War) or persistent preferences for local goods, the "border" effect does 
not disappear even after controlling for myriad factors including network, institution, endowment and 
demographic differences across pairs of states. The paper's key insight is that ''historical events have 
shaped cultural determinants of trade which still matter today'' (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014, p. 384).
Besides trade flows, some studies use tax (e.g., Xing & Li, 2011) and price (e.g., Noton, 2015) data 
to study home bias. Xing and Li (2011) study intra‐province trade in China using VAT invoice statistics. 
VAT invoices contain the locations of both sellers and buyers, and transactions between two parties lo-
cated in the same province are intra‐province trade. Data for the 2003–04 period show a 59–62% share 
for intra‐province trade. Using various empirical specifications rooted in the trade gravity equation, 
Xing and Li find that intra‐province trade is four to five times as large as inter‐province trade.
Studies using aggregate trade flow data for the most part are unable to disentangle the role of trade 
costs vis‐à‐vis consumer preferences as sources of home bias because trade flow data capture the net 
effects of supply and demand factors. Using yearly data for automobiles (e.g., list prices in five 
European countries, car characteristics, brand and other characteristics) in 1970–99, Noton (2015) 
finds that more than half of European carmakers' market shares are due to consumer preferences for 
European cars (home bias effect).6 For example, the (mean) market share of French‐branded cars in 
France is 69.9%, but without home bias, the estimated market share is only 31%. Noton's (2015) find-
ings suggest that lowering trade costs might have little effect on relative market shares of domestic‐ 
and foreign‐branded cars.
As described in the introductory section, Coughlin and Novy (2018) hypothesise that frictions at 
the firm level might be one of the reasons for the heterogeneity in the border effects they observe using 
US state‐level data. This is the framework underlying our empirical approach. Heterogeneity in both 
SME and market characteristics might affect whether and how much SMEs sell in various markets. 
Because selling in each market entails additional costs, in the next section, we detail enterprise and 
market characteristics that could offset or add to these costs.
3 |  DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data
We use data from the 2011, 2013 and 2015 versions of the ‘Survey of Small and Medium Scale 
Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam’ made available by United Nations University World 
Institute for Development Research (UNU‐WIDER). The survey covers only non‐state manufacturing 
enterprises in Hanoi (including ex‐Ha Tay), Hai Phong, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam 
6 Noton (2015) identifies different factors behind home bias. This includes ""nationalism", network quality (cheaper spare 
parts or repair service), brand loyalty…" Noton (2015, p. 125). In contrast, Evans (2007) finds that home bias is due mostly to 
location factors rather than foreignness of goods sold. Evans arrives at this conclusion by comparing the sales of domestically 
produced goods, imports originating from the United States, and sales of foreign affiliates of US multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in each market. For the most part, sales of domestically produced goods are higher than imports from the United 
States (border effect due to both location and foreignness) and sales of foreign affiliates of US MNEs are larger than imports 
from the United States (border effect due to location factors only). The estimated home bias coefficients in both cases are 
quite similar indicating that foreignness as a source of home bias is not important.
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Dong, Ho Chi Minh City and Long An. To ensure representation by ownership type across the nine areas, 
stratified sampling is used. The survey asks the sales structure of the most important product (in terms of 
value) sold by the SMEs. SMEs identify the percentage of sales to customers located in the same commune 
as the SME, in other communes within the home district, in other districts within the home province, in 
neighbouring provinces, in non‐neighbouring provinces and in foreign locations (direct exports). Based on 
sales of their most important product, available data show that SMEs are not only domestic‐market ori-
ented, their activities are highly localised. The mean percentage of sales in SMEs' home commune, other 
communes in the home district and other districts in the home province are 25–30% each for the three 
survey years. The mean share of sales to neighbouring or non‐neighbouring provinces is about 7–8% each. 
Moreover, 72–73% do not sell to neighbouring provinces, while 78–81% do not sell to non‐neighbouring 
provinces.7 These suggest much difficulty in reaching markets beyond one's home province.
3.2 | Econometric methodology
Because our main variable of interest is the percentage or proportion of sales across various markets, 
the fractional multinomial logit (FMLOGIT) model is used. The FMLOGIT model accounts for the 
bounded nature of the dependent variables which comprise the proportion of SME sales in their home 
communes, other communes in their home districts, other districts in their home provinces, neigh-
bouring provinces, non‐neighbouring provinces and exports.8 In essence, we ask what enterprise char-
acteristics matter in the proportion of SME i sales to any of the identified m markets at time t. The 
model is then augmented with area or market characteristics. Since data for commune and district 
characteristics are not available, for this section of the paper, we aggregate sales inside the SMEs' 
home province and compare these to sales in neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces (exports 
are excluded since very few SMEs export).9 Using FMLOGIT, the predicted proportion of sales in 
each market m, ŝm, depends on explanatory variables in matrix x (defined below) as follows:
where m = 1, …, M, with m = 1 (home commune) as reference or base market. That is, we normalise 
β1 = 0. Buis (2010) shows that FMLOGIT maximises a quasi‐log likelihood function with actual (sm) and 
predicted (ŝm) proportions as follows:
7 Details are provided in Table S1 available at the journal's website.
8 Vietnam has 58 provinces each governed by a Provincial People's Committee. Can Tho, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai 
Phong and Da Nang are municipalities and are administratively equivalent to provinces. For brevity, we refer to these 
municipalities as provinces. Below the provincial authorities are district and commune authorities. Nationwide there are more 
than 700 districts and close to 12,000 communes (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018). See Do et al. (2017) for an 
overview of the structure of Vietnam's government.
9 We focus on non‐exporters and refer readers to the rich literature studying the exporting decisions of Vietnamese SMEs. An 
early contribution is Kokko and Sjöholm (2005). Recently, Co et al. (2018) extend this literature by introducing SMEs’ 
subcontracting decisions. A related literature is the productivity enhancing effect of exporting (see e.g., Newman et al., 2017).
ŝ1 =
1
1+
∑M
m=2
exp(xm)
ŝ2 =
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Because of normalisation and the FMLOGIT being a non‐linear model, the estimated coefficients 
are not easily interpretable. Thus, we provide (average) marginal effects invariant to the chosen refer-
ence market when analysing the results below.
3.2.1 | SME characteristics
The effects of spatial frictions are heterogeneous across various SME characteristics. The SME litera-
ture has identified size10 and age to be important determinants of SME sales growth (e.g., Ayyagari, 
Demirguc‐Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2014). These two factors are similarly relevant when studying the 
distribution of sales across markets. This is because selling in various markets entails additional costs. 
Larger enterprises have more resources to pay for these additional costs, while older enterprises have 
more experience in handling challenges when selling in unfamiliar or less familiar markets. Thus, the 
proportion of sales outside of SMEs' home markets is expected to be positively correlated with enter-
prise size and age. The literature reviewed in Section 2 informs the inclusion of other factors in the 
econometric models estimated.
Combes et al. (2005) and Wrona (2018) emphasise the important role of networks in explaining 
home bias. We control for two types of networks: the number of memberships in business associations 
(business network size) and the number of people with which owners/managers have regular contact 
(social network size). The latter includes regular contact with business people, bank officials, gov-
ernment officials and politicians. Participation in networks is potentially advantageous as they might 
provide leads for market expansion beyond one's home market. We hypothesise that the proportion of 
sales outside of SMEs' home markets is positively associated with the number of business association 
memberships and the size of owners' or managers' social network.
Incomplete information on the demand side might limit sales outside enterprises' home market 
(Combes et al., 2005). To alleviate this informational problem, SMEs might secure internationally 
recognised quality certifications, such as ISO 9000, which signal commitment to quality produc-
tion to customers who otherwise have limited or no information about the enterprise.11 An enter-
prise's reputation is more likely to be known by customers in its home market, so having an 
internationally recognised quality certification could potentially expand an SME's market reach 
beyond its home market. Certifications is set equal to 1, for enterprises holding at least one of 
these certifications. Based on Combes et al. (2005), we hypothesise that informational barriers are 
lowest inside one's home commune, followed by one's home district and province, and informa-
tional barriers are highest between non‐neighbouring provinces. Thus, we expect a larger propor-
tion of sales outside of one's home market for SMEs with internationally recognised quality 
certifications.
Home bias could also be due to agglomeration economies (e.g., to reap benefits from proximity to 
customers or suppliers). As described by Coughlin and Novy (2013), localisation could be due to 
producers locating close to customers, or producers agglomerating close to input suppliers. Available 
data allow us to investigate these issues indirectly using each enterprise's overall production struc-
ture12 (percentage of production used for final consumption, final consumption share) and the distance 
10 We use the number of full‐time employees for size. To keep SMEs with zero full‐time employees, we use 1 + number of 
full‐time employees when taking the natural log.
11 Certifications require enterprises to "adopt and document extensive quality assurance management systems that require 
nontrivial investments" in resources and time, and third‐party audits are required (Potoski & Prakash, 2009, p. 222).
12 The structure of production for each market (e.g., home commune) is not available in the data set.
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of the enterprise's most important supplier (distance from suppliers). Agglomeration forces are work-
ing in SMEs' home markets if the proportion of sales in home markets is positively (negatively) cor-
related with final consumption share (distance from suppliers).
Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprise access to paved roads is important too. Latest data (2016) show 
that 77% of freight was moved by road transportation, less than one% was transported by rail, and about 
17% was transported using inland waterways (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018). We only con-
sider access to road networks because of our emphasis on domestic market sales. Moreover, because of 
rail's unreliability relative to other modes of transport, shippers avoid its use (Banomyong, Thai, & Yuen, 
2015) while shipments originating in the Mekong Delta or Red River Delta are transported via inland 
waterways before their sea voyage to foreign markets. The proportion of SME sales outside of home 
markets is expected to be higher when an SME has access to paved roads. However, Banomyong et al. 
(2015) indicate that the service quality of the trucking industry in Vietnam is still low and access to effi-
cient logistics service providers is limited.13 Both might limit the usefulness of paved road access.
Three sets of qualitative indicators are included. First, two period indicators (SY15 and SY13 are set 
to 1 for 2015 and 2013, respectively, 0 otherwise) control for time‐specific shocks that affect all enter-
prises in the same way. Survey year 2011 is the base period. Second, two indicators define ownership 
type with household establishments as base. Ownership1 is set equal to 1 for sole proprietorships, 
partnerships and collectives/cooperatives; 0 otherwise. Ownership2 is set equal to 1 for limited liabil-
ity and joint stock companies without state capital; 0 otherwise. Among the three ownership types, a 
larger proportion of sales in home markets is expected for household establishments. Third, three in-
dicators classify SMEs by their sector. Sector1 includes SMEs producing electronic machinery, motor 
vehicles and other transport equipment. Sector2 includes SMEs producing textiles, leather and wood. 
Sector3 includes SMEs producing paper, petroleum, chemicals and other items for industrial use. The 
base sector includes food, apparel and publishing and printing (i.e., consumer items).
3.2.2 | Area or market characteristics
Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) emphasise the role of history in explaining home bias. In their view, his-
tory shape cultural determinants of trade flows. Vietnam's history, from the early years of Chinese political 
and cultural influence, French colonisation, American influence in the south, the Vietnam War, north and 
south reunification in 1975, experience with a centrally planned economy and economic reforms (doi moi), 
might have contributed to regional cultural differences, and these differences might have shaped manage-
ment practices (Zhu, 2003) and consumer preferences. These regional differences are evident in some sur-
veys. For example, a survey conducted by Benzing, Chu, and Callanan (2005) shows regional differences 
in three areas: entrepreneurial motivation for starting a business, perceived factors contributing to business 
success and problems facing entrepreneurs. The authors find that northern (Hanoi) entrepreneurs start 
businesses to earn more income while southern (Ho Chi Minh City) entrepreneurs start businesses to have 
greater independence. Among perceived factors contributing to success, northern entrepreneurs attribute 
more importance to community and political involvement than southern entrepreneurs. Southern entre-
preneurs rank competition as a significant problem, while northern entrepreneurs identify government 
regulations and lack of business acumen (e.g., lack of management and marketing expertise) as significant 
problems. Lack of business experience limits northern businesses' ability to bring their products beyond 
the local market (Benzing et al., 2005). These suggest that home bias can originate from the supply side.
13 According to the World Bank's (2018) logistics performance index, the quality of Vietnam's trade and transport‐related 
infrastructure improved very slightly from 2.6 to 2.7 (where 1 is low quality and 5 is high quality) between 2010 and 2016, 
while the competence and quality of the country's logistics services remained at 2.9.
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On the demand side, preferences for local products may explain home bias (e.g., preference for Hanoi 
brand beer in the north and Saigon brand beer in the south). People in the north also have a more collec-
tivist attitude than people in the south due to a much longer experience with a centrally planned economy 
(Nguyen, Jung, Lantz, & Loeb, 2003). Collectivists tend to account for others' perceptions of their actions 
more than individualists, so consumers in the north might prefer home goods more than consumers in 
the south. Collectivist–individualist differences may shape consumption patterns across regions as well.
We introduce a north dummy to account for the role of history in explaining current economic 
patterns. We define north = 1, when an SME is based in Hanoi, Hai Phong, Phu Tho or Nghe An and 
north = 0, when an SME is based in Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, Ho Chi Minh City or Long 
An. This variable accounts for differences in business culture between the north and other areas (see, 
e.g., Cung, Pham, Bui, & Dapice, 2004). We hypothesise that SMEs in the north are more insular as 
commercial activities in the country have predominantly been in the south, the seat of government 
being in the north for most of the country's history,14 and pro‐entrepreneurial attitudes are more prev-
alent in southern provinces (Nguyen, Mickiewicz, & Du, 2017). Moreover, due to their more collec-
tivist nature, northern consumers might prefer to buy more from local (home) sellers.
Inspired by the trade gravity literature, we also control for an area's potential market size using 
total income. Following Evans (2003) and Helliwell and Verdier (2001), each province j's distance‐
weighted neighbour and non‐neighbour potential market sizes are as follows:
We hypothesise that the fraction of SMEs sales to each market is positively associated with the 
potential size of the market.15
We take advantage of variations in provinces' governance quality. According to Vu, Zouikri, and 
Deffains (2014), the economic reforms (doi moi) that started in the late 1980s brought forth decentralised 
policymaking wherein provincial governments engaged in policy experimentation in areas where central 
government rules were non‐existent or inappropriate. One consequence of decentralisation is inter‐juris-
dictional competition for resources among provincial governments. A new round of decentralisation has 
occurred since 2005 when the second State Budget Law came in force in 2004. This law delineates how 
provinces and the central government share tax revenues (Vu, 2016).16 Vu (2016) concludes that this 
round of decentralisation has led to competition among the provinces and competition ‘has become so 
fierce that each province only cares about the economic activities within its territory … the administrative 
boundaries between provinces have virtually become their economic borders' Vu (2016, p. 197). Although 
14 Most of Champa (central part) became part of Vietnam in 1,471, Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) became part of Vietnam in 
1,700, and the country's current border took shape more or less in 1,840 (Osborne et al. 2018).
Ajn =
∑
n∈neighbours
Incomen
Distancejn
,
Ajn� =
∑
n� ∈ non−neighbours
Incomen�
Distancejn�
.
15 The trade gravity literature uses gross output as proxy for market size. We are unable to find provinces' gross output for our 
period of analysis, so we use total income from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2018). For weights, we use pairwise 
(as the crow flies) distances (in km.) between the capital cities of provinces obtained from dista nceca lcula tor.net.
16 Provinces in Vietnam do not charge sales taxes, so variation in sales taxes cannot explain variation in SME sales across 
markets.
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provincial authorities do not consider the effects of their policies on activities outside of their jurisdic-
tions, these do potentially affect economic activities outside provinces' jurisdictions.
Do variations in Vietnamese provinces' governance quality affect the distribution of SMEs' sales 
across various markets? We use three components of Vietnam's Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCI) to account for variations in governance quality: transparency, corruption and proactivity 
(Malesky, 2016).17 The indices are based on surveys of domestic businesses' perceptions of the quality 
of governance across Vietnam's provinces.18 Transparency includes accessibility to information, pre-
dictability of implementation of central government laws at the provincial level and other elements. If 
personal relationships with local officials play a role in information access, then businesses might 
divert resources to build relationships with local officials instead of using these to grow their busi-
nesses. Lack of transparency breeds opportunities for corruption, and informal payments to corrupt 
local officials divert resources away from one's business too. Businesses tend to thrive in areas where 
local officials are proactively solving problems businesses face. Policymakers in these areas are inno-
vative; thus, opportunities in these areas are abundant.19 We hypothesise that the proportion of SME 
sales is lower in areas with low governance quality (i.e., areas with less transparent rules, where cor-
ruption is prevalent, and where officials are not innovative).
The quality of neighbouring provinces' institutions might matter too. For example, Miranda and 
Wagner (2018) find that having neighbours with weak institutions reduces a country's exports of con-
tract‐intensive goods. We build on this idea and introduce the governance quality of each province's 
neighbours (provinces they share a border with) and non‐neighbours. In other words, besides home 
province governance quality, do the governance quality of provinces' neighbours and non‐neighbours 
matter too?20 Following Miranda and Wagner (2018), we use total income as weights for neighbours' 
and non‐neighbours' governance quality.
4 |  ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
To mitigate problems associated with entry and exit, only enterprises observed in the three survey 
years are included in the estimations. Table 1 contains summary statistics for our estimation sample 
17 Nguyen et al. (2017) use these same indices to study SME revenue growth.
18 Since 2013, the PCI has 10 sub‐indices ranging from 1 to 10 with high values indicating good governance. We should note 
that the composition of the sub‐indices changed slightly in 2013, but this did not change the nature of what aspects of 
governance these indices are measuring (Malesky, 2016).
19 Based on interviews, Schmitz et al. (2015) conclude that economic reforms at the subnational level required a combination 
of proactive provincial officials and an organised private sector, and SMEs mostly have little influence in reforms.
20 Take product and goods quality. Responsibilities for product and goods quality examinations are assigned to central 
government agencies, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, and provincial product and goods examination 
agencies. The latter are responsible for examining product and goods quality in their jurisdictions (Article 45 of the Law on 
Product and Goods Quality, National Assembly Law No. 05/2007/QH12). The Ministry of Science of Technology is the lead 
agency for the unified control of product and goods quality nationwide. Other ministries (in coordination with the lead 
agency) are responsible for quality in their respective domains (e.g., Ministry of Health for food, pharmaceuticals, and other 
related items). Subject to decentralisation rules, People's Committees at all levels are also responsible for the control of 
product and goods quality in their jurisdictions (Articles 68–70 of the Law on Product and Goods Quality). Although 
provincial product and goods quality agencies are required to follow regulations set by the central government agencies, 
heterogeneity in governance quality across the provinces might lead to variations in quality control rules and examination 
outcomes. English version of the Law on Product and Goods Quality is available at http://vbpl.vn/tw/Pages/ vbpqen-toanv 
an.aspx?dv=13&ItemI D=3036.
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with mean home province sales over 80% and 8% each for sales in neighbouring and non‐neighbour-
ing provinces. On average, SMEs have 12 full‐time employees. The mean enterprise age is 14 years. 
The number of memberships in business associations ranges from 0 to 6 with a mean of 0.11, while 
T A B L E  1  Summary statistics
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Enterprise characteristics        
Proportion of sales in:        
Home commune 0.28 0.32 0 1
Other communes in home district 0.29 0.26 0 1
Other districts in home province 0.25 0.28 0 1
Neighbouring provinces 0.08 0.17 0 1
Non‐neighbouring provinces 0.08 0.20 0 1
Exports 0.02 0.11 0 1
Number of employees 12.37 24.06 0 300
Enterprise age 14.25 7.98 0 58
Business network size 0.11 0.41 0 6
Social network size 8.91 2.63 4 16
Has certification 0.05 0.23 0 1
Final consumption sales (in %) 41.23 39.83 0 100
Distance from suppliers (in km) 45.06 230.93 0.1 7,000
Has access to paved roads 0.81 0.39 0 1
Home province characteristics        
Northern province 0.57 0.50 0 1
Real income (billion dong) 92,600 88,200 9,740 293,000
Transparency 6.05 0.45 5.12 6.89
Corruption 5.69 0.85 4.31 7.75
Proactivity 3.84 0.91 2.32 6.61
Neighbouring provinces characteristics        
Real incomea (billion dong) 2,850 2,260 341 9,590
Transparencyb 5.99 0.32 5.25 6.72
Corruptionb 5.91 0.75 4.43 7.23
Proactivityb 4.82 0.75 2.72 6.20
Non‐neighbouring provinces characteristics        
Real incomea (billion dong) 3,070 1,270 1,540 6,860
Transparencyb 6.00 0.16 5.76 6.25
Corruptionb 5.99 0.65 5.02 6.68
Proactivityb 4.69 0.30 4.30 5.19
Notes: Balanced panel sample. Number of enterprises = 1,630 and number of observations = 4,890.
aDistance‐weighted real income. 
bIncome‐weighted index. 
Source of data: 2011, 2013 and 2015 Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam (UNU‐WIDER, 
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), & The Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), various years)
3330 |   CO et al.
the size of social networks ranges from 4 to 16 with a mean of 9. Only 5% have internationally recog-
nised quality certifications. SME production for final consumption averages 41%, the mean distance 
to suppliers is 45 km, 81% have access to paved roads, and 57% of the SMEs are in northern provinces. 
For the nine SME home provinces, the mean real (total) income is VND92.6 trillion (about US$4.5 
billion at the mean exchange rate of VND20640/US$ for our period of analysis), while the distance‐
weighted mean incomes are VND2.85 trillion (about US$133 million) and VND3.07 trillion (US$149 
million) for neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces, respectively. The mean transparency and 
corruption indices for the nine home provinces are comparable to neighbouring and non‐neighbouring 
provinces' mean income‐weighted indices. The nine home provinces' mean proactivity index is low-
est, and this is mostly due to some northern provinces' (e.g., Hanoi and Hai Phong) low index values.
Pairwise correlations among SME characteristics and area characteristics appear in Tables 2 and 
3 (trimmed sample described below), respectively. The highest pairwise correlations among the SME 
characteristics are between the natural log of the number of full‐time employees and three other 
enterprise characteristics (e.g., 0.36 with the natural log of distance from suppliers; Table 2). The 
correlation of the natural log of income between a pair of markets (e.g., home and neighbour) is 
positive (Table 3). The three governance indicators exhibit variegated pattern. Home and neighbour-
ing provinces' transparency indices are positively correlated (0.54), but the correlation is practically 
zero between home and non‐neighbouring provinces' transparency indices. All pairwise correlation 
indices for corruption are highly positive (at least 0.69). Home provinces' proactivity indices are not 
correlated with neighbouring provinces' (−0.08) and negatively correlated with non‐neighbouring 
provinces' proactivity indices (−0.16).
We first establish which of the enterprise characteristics matter in determining the share of sales in 
each market. Since the FMLOGIT model is non‐linear and the coefficient estimates for the enterprise 
characteristics in each market are relative to those in the base market (home commune), we provide 
(average) marginal effects throughout.21 To account for the panel nature of the data set, the standard 
errors of the FMLOGIT model are clustered using enterprise identification. The model has explanatory 
power according to the Wald chi‐square statistic in Table 4. From the marginal effects at the 5% level 
of significance, we make several observations. First, the share of sales outside of SMEs' home district 
is positively correlated with employment. A one% increase in SME employment increases the share of 
sales in other districts within the province by about 7 percentage points (column (3)), and the share of 
sales to other provinces increases by 2–3 percentage points (columns (4) and (5)), all else equal. 
Second, older SMEs either have larger shares of sales in their home communes, non‐neighbouring 
21 Coefficient estimates for all models are available from the authors on request.
T A B L E  2  Pairwise correlations: enterprise characteristics
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. number of employees (1) 1.000          
Enterprise age (2) −0.197 1.000        
Business network size (3) 0.252 0.004 1.000      
Social network size (4) 0.352 −0.076 0.148 1.000    
Final consumption share (5) −0.350 0.062 −0.085 −0.129 1.000  
Log. distance from suppliers (6) 0.360 −0.113 0.125 0.182 −0.160 1.000
Notes: Balanced panel sample. Number of enterprises = 1,630 and number of observations = 4,890.
Source of data: 2011, 2013 and 2015 Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam (UNU‐
WIDER et al., various years)
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provinces or foreign markets, but the marginal effects are small. Third, the share of sales in other prov-
inces is positively correlated with the number of memberships in business associations, with each ad-
ditional membership increasing the share of sales in neighbouring provinces by 1.3 percentage points 
and in non‐neighbouring provinces by 2.6 percentage points. Practically, these are economically large 
effects considering that the mean share of sales in these markets is about 8% (Table 1).
Fourth, there is no evidence that the size of SMEs' social network and having an internationally 
recognised quality certification are correlated with the share of sales in various markets except for 
export sales. On average, the share of sales to foreign markets is 3 percentage points higher for SMEs 
with internationally recognised quality certifications. Fifth, the larger an SME's production is for final 
consumption, the larger the share of sales in their home communes and home districts, and the smaller 
the share of sales in other markets. Sixth, not surprising, the farther away the source of SMEs' inputs, 
the larger the share of sales in other provinces, ceteris paribus. Lastly, there is no evidence that access 
to paved roads is associated with the share of sales in various markets, except exports (but with a neg-
ative sign). This is perhaps not surprising as a large percentage of the SMEs have access to paved 
roads. Moreover, road quality and availability of logistics services might be more relevant than mere 
access to paved roads.22 As previously mentioned, access to efficient logistics services in Vietnam is 
still limited (Banomyong et al., 2015).
Because area characteristics at the commune and district levels are not available, only sales at 
home, neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces are considered subsequently. SMEs that export 
are excluded to focus on domestic sales. Table 5 contains the marginal effects with just the SME char-
acteristics for this trimmed sample. For the most part, the results are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 4. To recap our findings related to enterprise characteristics: we find that the proportion of sales 
outside an SME's home province is positively associated with SME size, age, business network size 
and distance from its most important supplier, while the proportion of sales outside the home market 
is negatively associated with the share of SME production for final consumption. Not surprising, 
compared to household enterprises, enterprises with legal forms included in Ownership2 (i.e., corpo-
rations) sell proportionally less in their home provinces and proportionally more in other provinces. 
Compared to SMEs in the base sector (food, apparel and publishing and printing), SMEs in other 
manufacturing sectors sell proportionally less in their home provinces and proportionally more in 
other provinces. We find no evidence that the proportion of SME sales in these markets is associated 
with the size of their social network, ownership of internationally recognised quality certifications and 
access to paved roads.
Our findings are consistent with Coughlin and Novy's (2018) hypothesis that home bias can be 
due to frictions at the enterprise level, in particular, SME market entry strategies due to their char-
acteristics (e.g., size and age). Combes et al. (2005) and Wrona (2018) highlight the role of networks 
in cross‐border trade flows among subnational units in France and Japan, respectively. We confirm 
the importance of business networks (but not social networks) in explaining inter‐provincial trade 
in Vietnam. Our results are also consistent with the agglomeration economies' explanations to home 
bias (Coughlin & Novy, 2013). Home bias might be due to proximity to customers (i.e., a higher 
22 In fact, available data show a large variation in the percentage of surveyed enterprises responding that road quality is good 
or very good, from 80% (Danang) to 11% (Dak Nong) with Da Nang (Dak Nong) having 90% (66%) of provincially managed 
roads asphalted in 2010 (Malesky and Dau, 2010). By 2016, responses that road quality is good or very good range from 80% 
(Danang) to 24% (Cao Bang), despite both provinces having close to 100% of provincial roads asphalted (Malesky, 2016). 
We are unable to use road quality perception in place of access to paved roads as data are not available for all 3 years of our 
study period.
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proportion of sales in the home province when the production structure is for final consumption) 
and proximity to suppliers (i.e., a higher proportion of sales in the home province the closer the 
main input supplier).
T A B L E  5  Fractional multinomial logit regression: average marginal effects of enterprise characteristics
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Home province Neighbouring provinces Non‐neighbouring provinces
SY13 0.0141* −0.0031 −0.0110*
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
SY15 0.0125 0.0017 −0.0142**
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Ownership1 −0.0106 0.0143 −0.0037
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Ownership2 −0.0376** 0.0120 0.0256**
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
Sector1 −0.0684*** 0.0411*** 0.0273*
  (0.023) (0.014) (0.015)
Sector2 −0.0891*** 0.0350*** 0.0541***
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
Sector3 −0.0525*** 0.0279*** 0.0246***
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Employment (log) −0.0570*** 0.0236*** 0.0333***
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Age −0.0018*** 0.0006 0.0012***
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Business network size −0.0370*** 0.0107** 0.0263***
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Social network size 0.0021 −0.0003 −0.0018
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Has certification 0.0085 0.0035 −0.0121
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
Final consumption share 0.1557*** −0.0749*** −0.0807***
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.011)
Dist. from suppliers (log) −0.0148*** 0.0066*** 0.0083***
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Has paved road access 0.0202 −0.0056 −0.0147
  (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
Log pseudolikelihood −2,200.78    
Wald chi‐sq. 896.75***    
No. of establishments 1,557    
No. of observations 4,671    
Note: See notes in Table 4.
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The above results are quite robust when enterprise characteristics are augmented with area or mar-
ket characteristics23 which includes a qualitative indicator to capture either cultural differences in the 
conduct of business between SMEs located in northern and other (central and southern) provinces, or 
preference differences among consumers in these areas; total income; and governance quality. Recall 
that three indices capturing various aspects of governance are used. The Wald chi‐square statistics in 
Table 6 indicate the model has explanatory power in each of the three specifications, while the joint 
coefficient tests for the area or market characteristics (Wald chi‐square statistics) suggest that at least 
one of these additional factors explains the proportion of SME sales across markets.24
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 contain the marginal effects when transparency indices are used. 
At the 5% level of significance, the results show that the proportion of sales in the home province 
(neighbouring provinces) is higher (lower) among SMEs in the north, controlling for all other fac-
tors. The share of home province sales is 5.4 percentage points higher (column (1)), while the share 
of sales to neighbouring provinces is 2.6 percentage points lower (column (2)) for northern SMEs. 
These are consistent with our expectations that SMEs in the north are more insular and thus will 
sell proportionally less outside of their home markets. This is also consistent with the notion that 
northern consumers prefer home goods more. The proportion of sales in home markets (neighbour-
ing markets) is negatively (positively) associated with home province income and neighbouring 
provinces' distance‐weighted income. According to microeconomic theory, consumer preferences 
are income dependent. Our results suggest that when home province income is high, home con-
sumers have the resources to purchase items from sellers outside of their locale (instead of buying 
more from sellers based in the home province as expected). Likewise, when neighbouring provinces' 
distance‐weighted income is high, home province SMEs can sell more to these provinces as con-
sumers in these neighbouring provinces also have the resources to purchase more items from home 
province SMEs.
The proportion of home province sales is negatively associated with home and neighbouring prov-
inces' transparency indices (column (1)), but the proportion of sales in neighbouring provinces is posi-
tively associated with home and neighbouring provinces' transparency indices (column (2)). Together, 
these imply that when home provinces' business rules and policies are transparent, SMEs have time 
and resources to grow their businesses beyond their home markets instead of devoting resources to 
accessing information or building relationships with local provincial officials. Thus, they can sell 
proportionally more to customers in neighbouring provinces. A one‐point increase (improvement) in 
home provinces' transparency index translates to close to a 3 percentage point increase in the share 
of sales to neighbouring provinces (column (2)), ceteris paribus. This is an economically large effect 
as the mean share of sales to neighbouring markets is 8% (Table 1). Moreover, when neighbour-
ing provinces' transparency index increases, SMEs appear to sell proportionally less in their home 
markets. This is because improvements in governance quality suggest lower costs in accessing less 
familiar neighbouring markets. A one‐point increase in neighbouring provinces' income‐weighted 
transparency index translates to a 13.7 percentage point drop in the share of sales in the home market. 
An increase in non‐neighbouring provinces' transparency index implies proportionally smaller home 
market sales, but proportionally larger sales in neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces. These 
results make sense, but we caution that the estimated marginal effects are surprisingly large for this 
specification.
23 For this reason, only the marginal effects of the area or market characteristics are included in subsequent tables to conserve 
space. Complete results are provided in the Appendix S1 available at the journal's website.
24 Marginal effects for all regressors are in Tables S2–S4 available at the journal's website.
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Among the three governance indicators, the corruption indices have the highest pairwise correla-
tions, while the proactivity indices have the lowest pairwise correlations across Vietnam's provinces 
(see Table 3). Qualitatively, the results using the corruption indices (columns (4) to (6) of Table 6) 
are comparable to those using the transparency indices with two important differences. First, the 
north dummy variable is no longer statistically significant in this specification. Second, neighbours' 
distance‐weighted income is also statistically insignificant in this specification. From Table 3, we see 
that the pairwise correlations among the income variables and transparency indices are consistently 
positive throughout. That is, high‐income areas tend to have better governance. But, the opposite is 
true for income and the corruption indices. Home and non‐neighbouring provinces with high income 
tend to have bad governance. The robustness checks below will show that the loss in statistical sig-
nificance observed here is due to collinearity among the income variables and the corruption indices.
As in the previous specification, the share of sales in home provinces is negatively associated with 
home provinces' corruption index (column (4)). However, this leads to proportionally larger sales in 
both neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces (columns (5) and (6)). Together, the results imply 
that as home provinces' corruption index increases (i.e., home governance quality improves), SMEs 
could expand and sell beyond their home markets because less SME resources are devoted to informal 
payments. The share of sales to neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces increases by 5.2 and 
2.1 percentage points, respectively, for a one‐point increase in home provinces' corruption index. This 
complements each area's respective improvements in income‐weighted governance quality with mar-
ginal effects of 0.024 (neighbouring provinces) and 0.172 (non‐neighbouring provinces).
Finally, as in the two previous specifications, SMEs in provinces with officials proactively solv-
ing business problems and having positive attitudes towards the private sector sell proportionally 
a smaller share at home (column (7) of Table 6) and proportionally a larger share to neighbouring 
provinces (column (8)) with marginal effects of −0.029 and 0.023, respectively. Likewise, these com-
plement each area's governance quality, with a one‐point increase in neighbouring (non‐neighbouring) 
provinces' income‐weighted proactivity index contributing to a 4.8 (15.3) percentage point increase 
in the share of sales to neighbouring (non‐neighbouring) provinces. As in the specification using the 
corruption indices, there is no evidence that SMEs in northern provinces sell proportionally more in 
their home markets, and the income variables are statistically insignificant.
Our results are consistent with Miranda and Wagner's (2018) finding that neighbours' institutions 
matter in trade flows. Thus, there is incentive for policymakers in Vietnam's provinces to coordinate 
policies for private sector development. Ceteris paribus, good governance at home encourages home 
enterprises to venture out while neighbours' good governance has a ‘pull’ effect on these SMEs.
4.1 | Robustness of results
We conduct a number of robustness checks starting with the sequential addition of area characteristics 
to ensure that our results are not sensitive to multicollinearity concerns. Select marginal effects for the 
three specifications are summarised in Table 7.25 Our findings pertaining to enterprises' characteristics 
are quite robust to the sequential addition of the characteristics of home provinces, neighbouring 
provinces and non‐neighbouring provinces. At the 5% level of significance, results indicate that when 
statistically significant, the north province indicator suggests smaller (larger) proportion of sales in 
home provinces (neighbouring and non‐neighbouring provinces) in two of the three specifications. 
This is opposite of our a priori expectations that SMEs in the north might be less entrepreneurial and 
are expected to venture less outside of their home markets because of the region's longer experience 
25 Marginal effects for all regressors are in Tables S5–S7 available at the journal's website.
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with central planning, and the region being the seat of government for most of the country's history; 
or, with the idea that northern consumers have a more collectivist nature, and prefer home goods 
more. The mixed results could imply that enough time has lapsed such that the anti‐entrepreneurial 
effects or collectivist attitudes arising from a centrally planned economy in the north have dissipated. 
Thus, conclusions pertaining to differences in the conduct of business or consumer preferences be-
tween the north and other areas (central and south) must remain tentative. The proportion of home 
market sales is negatively associated with both income and governance quality throughout Vietnam, 
while the proportion of sales outside of SMEs' home market is positively associated with income and 
governance quality. These conclusions are quite robust across all specifications considered thus far.
To take full advantage of the benefits emanating from the new Law on Support for Small‐ and 
Medium‐sized Enterprises, household enterprises must convert to other legal forms such as sole pro-
prietorships or joint stock companies (Article 16).26 On average, the proportion of home province 
sales for household enterprises is 0.90 compared to 0.73 for non‐household enterprises. To account for 
the possibility that household enterprises face special challenges or different factors drive their sales 
strategy across markets, we run separate regressions for household and non‐household enterprises. We 
only include SMEs that did not change household/non‐household status in the three survey years. The 
marginal effects for area or market characteristics are reported in Table 8.27 The marginal effects for 
these two groups are qualitatively similar so there is no evidence that different factors drive household 
enterprises' sales across various markets. Moreover, the results are similar to those described previ-
ously. Therefore, the new SME law's push for households to convert to other legal forms is not ex-
pected to undermine household enterprises' sales strategy, but might contribute to expansion of sales 
beyond their home markets.28
5 |  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We confirm Coughlin and Novy's (2018) idea that frictions at the micro level might explain home 
bias. At the enterprise level, we find that a larger proportion of sales in home markets for smaller and 
younger enterprises. Membership in business networks allows SMEs to increase the proportion of 
sales outside of their home markets. Unfortunately, the data set we use does not provide details on 
what the business associations are for (i.e., purpose), so we cannot be definite as to the exact reason, 
but membership clearly has benefits on SMEs' ability to sell beyond their home markets. These ben-
efits can be direct (e.g., the association provides sales leads) or indirect (e.g., the association com-
municate new government policies). Given the conclusion of Schmitz, Tuan, Hang, and McCulloch's 
(2015) conclusion that SMEs have little influence in policy reforms at the provincial level, business 
associations can strengthen their advocacy work for SMEs and provide SMEs with the necessary 
experience to advocate for themselves. Business associations can also work together (rather than 
compete for members) to highlight the advantages they provide to SMEs.
26 The two earlier decrees on SMEs (footnote 2) did not address the transformation of household enterprises into other legal 
forms.
27 Marginal effects for all regressors are in Tables S8–S10 available at the journal's website.
28 Two additional robustness checks are conducted: first, we consider all SMEs in the latest survey year (2015) instead of 
SMEs appearing in all three survey years to address concerns related to survival bias. Second, the mean of neighbours' and 
non‐neighbours' governance indices is used instead of the income‐weighted governance indices since the latter might be 
dominated by provinces with large income. Both confirm our main findings. Details are provided in the Appendix S1 
accompanying the paper.
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We also find evidence consistent with the agglomeration economies explanations found in the home 
bias literature. When SMEs' production structure is primarily for final consumption, then SMEs' sales are 
proportionally more in their home markets. Likewise, the farther the inputs are sourced, the larger the 
proportion of sales outside of the home market. Input sourcing and sales are complementary activities. To 
increase SME participation in production value chains and product distribution chains, the new Law on 
Support for Small‐ and Medium‐sized Enterprises directs provincial officials to provide rental support at 
industrial parks to local SMEs (Article 11). Although beneficial, our results suggest that operating inside 
industrial parks is but one of many alternatives of reaching customers beyond one's home province.29
Besides home province governance quality, neighbours' governance quality matters too. The pro-
portion of SME sales to neighbouring provinces is positively associated with these areas' governance 
quality. Interestingly, controlling for neighbouring provinces' governance quality, the proportion of 
home market sales decrease as the quality of home province governance improves. This is a surprising 
result but could be explained as follows: good home province governance frees SME resources (that 
would have otherwise been used for information gathering or informal payments) for use in entering 
unfamiliar or less familiar markets. When inter‐provincial barriers to trade are eased (e.g., through 
improvement of governance in both home and neighbouring provinces), SMEs benefit from market 
diversification because exposure to one market's potential weakness is alleviated, and as their markets 
expand, SMEs experience economies to scale. Consumers benefit too as more competition brings 
prices down for some items. Prices converge as localised markets become more integrated. Price con-
vergence is a pre‐condition to income convergence. Thus, there is an incentive for subnational policy-
makers to coordinate policies to bring about a more integrated market inside Vietnam.30
Due to its coverage, a limitation of the survey data used in this paper is that it is not helpful in un-
derstanding SME activities in Vietnam's less developed or frontier regions (e.g., Cao Bang province). 
Although the new Law on Support for Small‐ and Medium‐sized Enterprises gives priority to eligible 
SMEs owned by women or who employ more women (Article 5), no provision is made to eligible SMEs 
located in remote and thus less developed areas. This is a crucial missing piece in the new SME law.
A possible extension to this paper is to investigate how integrated SMEs in other northern provinces 
are to businesses in the two growth hubs in the north (Hanoi and Hai Phong) in terms of output markets, 
input markets (labour and raw materials), capital equipment sources and technical knowledge. To 
achieve internal market integration, and in the long‐term, income convergence across its regions, in the 
2007–15 period, Vietnam spent an annual average of US$1.1 billion (0.72% of GDP) building and im-
proving its road network (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2018). Yet Cung et al. (2004) document that de-
spite improvements in infrastructure (e.g., roads north of Hanoi leading to China), historically far fewer 
jobs are created in provinces around Hanoi and Hai Phong compared to provinces around Ho Chi Minh 
City. As mentioned previously, provinces in the northern midlands and mountain areas are still among 
the poorest in Vietnam despite investments in infrastructure. Perhaps closer cooperation among policy-
makers and businesses in these areas with entities in Hanoi and Hai Phong might generate more 
29 Among SMEs in the survey data used, less than 5% operate out of industrial parks or zones. This is not surprising as these 
parks or zones have been primarily developed to house enterprises with foreign equity that mainly export. We are unable to 
directly study the relationship between SME sales across various markets and whether SMEs operate out of industrial parks 
or zones as not operating in a park or zone is lumped together with operating in other types of parks or zones (e.g., high‐tech 
parks or zones) in the surveys.
30 The new Law on Support for Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Enterprises delegates coordination responsibilities to two 
ministries. The Ministry of Planning and Investment will "act as a coordinator and identify objectives, beneficiaries and focus 
of support for formulating and implementing of plans, programs and projects to support small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises 
nationwide" (Article 22), while the Ministry of Finance will coordinate the allocation of capital to support SMEs (Article 23). 
Our results highlight the need for coordination among subnational policymakers to achieve the new law's objectives.
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economic opportunities for SMEs in these areas.31 A similar investigation can be conducted for prov-
inces in the central region (with Da Nang as growth hub) and southern region (with Ho Chi Minh City 
as growth hub).32 Logically, the next step is to determine how integrated these three growth hubs are to 
each other, and what could be done to develop or strengthen links across these hubs.33
A branch of the literature has shown theoretically that frictions in the goods markets do not only 
contribute to home bias in goods consumption but also to home bias in financial (equity) investments 
(e.g., Coeurdacier, 2009). Thus, the observation that goods sales are highly localised might also be 
indicative of the need to work for a more integrated capital market in Vietnam.
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